

A Computational Model of Auditory Perceptual Learning: Predicting Learning Interference Across Multiple Tasks

David Little (d-little@u.northwestern.edu)

Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, Northwestern University
Evanston, IL 60208

Bryan Pardo (pardo@northwestern.edu)

Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, Northwestern University
Evanston, IL 60208

Beverly Wright (b-wright@northwestern.edu)

Department of Communication Sciences and Disorders, Northwestern University
Evanston, IL 60208, USA

Abstract

In this work we build a computational model of several auditory perceptual learning experiments. The modeled experiments show a pattern of learning interference which may help shed light on the structure of both short and long term stores of perceptual memory. It is our hypothesis that the observed interference patterns can be explained by the relationship of stimuli across tasks and how these relationships interact with the limits of human memory. We account for the fact that information is shared across tasks in our model through use of methodology from the machine learning community on transfer learning. When we introduce a set of plausible limits on memory, such a model demonstrates the same pattern of learning interference observed in the human experiments.

Keywords: Perceptual Learning; Perceptual Memory; Consolidation; Acquisition; Learning Interference; Transfer Learning

Introduction

With sufficient practice, human beings are able to enhance the acuity of their sensory systems. This is known in the literature as perceptual learning. Recent work in perceptual learning (e.g. Banai et al., 2009; Yotsumoto et al., 2008), has shown that learning on one task (which we call the *target*) may be prevented when a second task (which we call the *distractor*) is practiced either during or shortly after practice of the target: this is called *learning interference*. These results suggest distinct properties of short and long term stores of perceptual memory because what interfered with learning during practice was distinct from what interfered after practice (see the Human Data section for more detail).

Our working hypothesis is that the learning interference observed in these experiments is a consequence of how information is shared across tasks and the limits of human memory. We have built a computational model in an effort towards fully specifying and testing this hypothesis (see the Modeling section for details). An ideal observer would only benefit from sharing information across tasks. However, with the introduction of limited memory, sharing information can also lead to learning interference.


Such sharing of information across tasks is used to accomplish *transfer learning* in the machine learning community. We call a computational technique intended to accomplish

transfer learning, *computational transfer learning*. If a system (living or machine) can be seen to have better performance on one task after experience on some prior task, we call this *observable transfer learning*. Prior computational models of perceptual learning, though they have considered observable transfer learning, have ignored matters of computational transfer learning, either by modeling only a single task (e.g. Jacobs, 2009) or by treating learning across several tasks as a single monolithic learning problem (e.g. Petrov et al., 2005). Because of this, none of these models provide an account of how people appropriately segregate and share information across tasks. There are computational models concerned with human memory that can be understood to have some form of computational transfer learning (e.g. McClelland et al., 1995; Anderson, 2002), but these systems do not provide the detail needed to model the current experiments.

In this paper we model one set of learning interference experiments (Wright et al., 2009; Banai et al., 2009) using an ideal observer (Geisler, 2003). We do this by incorporating a method used for computational transfer learning (Roy & Kaelbling, 2007) (see the method section for details). On top of this ideal observer, we introduce a plausible set of memory limits. This approach has the merit of avoiding conflation between task constraints (which both humans and the ideal observer are subject to) and psychological constraints (which only humans are subject to). We hypothesize memory limits that a.) affect the number of distinct stimuli that could be remembered and that b.) introduce a process of consolidation, meaning that over a period of time memories move from a labile, short term form to a stable long term form. We found that when introducing all (and only all) of our limits, our model demonstrated the same pattern of learning interference observed in humans (see the evaluation for details).


Human Data

The experiments in Banai et al. (2009) and Wright et al. (2009) suggest two functionally distinct stages of perceptual learning. The first stage occurs *during* practice of a task. We call this stage *acquisition*. The second stage occurs *after* practice is complete and is called *consolidation*. This is



(a) The tasks performed by participants. Interval discrimination at 100 and 350 ms, and frequency discrimination at 1 kHz. The stimuli surrounded by a box all consist of the same interval. The other types of stimuli have distinct intervals.

Was there learning on the target task (T1)?



(b) A diagram of the results. Blocks represent number and type of tasks presented on a single day of practice. T2 only interfered with observable learning of T1 during acquisition, and F only interfered with observable learning of T1 during consolidation.

Figure 1: A summary of the results from Wright et al. (2009) and Banai et al. (2009)

supported by the way the *target* task, T1 (see Figure 1(a)) was interfered with. One task (T2) interfered *during* practice of the target but not afterwards, and the task (F1) interfered *after* practice of the target but not during. This dissociation between acquisition and consolidation makes the experiments interesting to model: straightforward interpretations for one half of the data can lead to contradictory predictions of the remaining data.

A point of clarity: throughout our work here we use the word *learning* to mean that some form of memory (either human or computational) is updated to reflect a new experience. When we need to make a distinction we use the term *observable learning* to mean a behaviorally observable improvement in task performance.

The conditions in this experiment involved three tasks: one target (T1) and two distractors (T2 and F). The target is an interval discrimination task. By the term *task* we mean a spe-

cific set of stimuli, and the responses expected for these stimuli (in perceptual learning T1 and T2 would often be referred to as the same task). In the target task (T1), the participant had to make a two interval forced choice, indicating which of the two presented stimuli contains a longer temporal interval: the stimuli for the task are shown on the first row of Figure 1(a). Participants heard the two stimuli in a randomized order and received feedback after each trial. The stimuli in T1 each contained two short sinusoidal tones at 1000 Hz, separated by a temporal interval that varied in length. One stimulus (called the *standard*) always contained a 100ms interval. The other stimulus (called the *comparison*) varied in length. The difference between the standard and the comparison is called the *delta*. Over the course of a block (60 trials), the delta was adjusted so that a subject's *threshold* was found. The threshold is the delta at which a person gets 79% of their responses correct (Levitt, 1971).

The two distracting tasks are related to the target in distinct ways. Task F (second row of Fig. 1(a)) is a frequency discrimination task meaning that instead of varying the interval of the comparison its frequency was varied over the course of learning. Task T2 (last row of Fig. 1(a)) was a second temporal interval discrimination task, where the standard was 350ms. All stimuli in task F have the *same* temporal interval as the standard of T1 (shown on the second row of Fig. 1(a)), and all stimuli in task T2 contain *distinct* temporal intervals from those present in T1. This is shown in Figure 1(a): a box is drawn around all stimuli that contain a 100ms temporal interval. All other stimuli contain a distinct interval.

There were four conditions in which one of the two distracting tasks was introduced either during acquisition of T1—by interleaving practice with T1—or during consolidation of T1—by presenting it in a block after T1 (also called *blocked* presentation). Figure 1(b) shows that task T2 interfered with the observable learning of T1 during *acquisition* and task F interfered with the observable learning during *consolidation*. Observable learning was said to occur if a subject showed a significantly greater improvement in their threshold, when compared to controls. Controls perform only a pre- and post-test. Participants performed a pre-test, at least 6 days of practice, and then a post-test.

Our hypothesis is that F prevents observable learning on T1 during consolidation because stimuli in T1 and F contain the *same* temporal interval. T2 prevents observable learning during acquisition because T1 and T2 have *distinct* temporal intervals. F1 and T2 place distinct strains on human memory which manifest as a different pattern of learning interference.

Modeling

Our model provides one explanation for why *distinct* temporal intervals across tasks would lead to interference during acquisition, and why having the *same* temporal intervals would interfere during consolidation. The idea is that some part of our memory cares solely about intervals, and this is the locus of learning. During acquisition having too many distinct

temporal intervals means that there is too much to keep track of; during consolidation having the same temporal interval across tasks prevents consolidation of the first task because the memories are too similar.

It is certainly possible that features other than temporal interval are relevant to the observed interference. However, our model is a demonstration that by using a set of plausible limits on human memory, these features are not *necessary* to explain the human data. To show this we built an ideal observer (Geisler, 2003) of our tasks but made use of only the temporal information in the stimuli. An ideal observer defines what “optimal” behavior is given the same information that humans have to perform a task. Our observer is ideal in the sense that it makes optimal use of the temporal information available in the stimuli. The ideal observer is useful as a baseline to compare to human performance. It is not intended to be psychologically plausible. On top of this ideal observer we introduce a set of memory limits.

Key to the observed learning interference is our model’s *item limit* and *recall limit*. During acquisition the number of distinct stimuli that can be represented in memory is limited (the item limit), this limitation leads to interference during acquisition when there are many distinct temporal intervals in the stimuli. During consolidation stimuli that resemble each other can cause a memory previously marked for long term storage to be returned to short term memory (the recall limit) leading to interference during consolidation when stimuli have similar temporal intervals across tasks. More details of our memory limits, and their justification are discussed in the subsection Hypothesized Psychological Limits.

We center our discussion of the model around the concept of a *stimulus model*. We start by describing the input provided to our model. We define the meaning of a stimulus model and how it relates to the input during decision making. Then we discuss how the model input is used to learn a better stimulus model, and how the psychological limits affect the results of learning. For full implementation details of our model we refer the reader to our technical report (Little et al., 2011).

Model Input

As shown in Figure 2, each auditory stimulus, s , presented to the model is transformed to an internal representation \mathbf{x} by the function $R(s)$. The ideal observer is meant to find the best possible decision, given the same information people have. Thus $R(s)$ should be consistent with our understanding of the pertinent information people have to make a decision. We assume for modeling purposes that the data can be explained solely in terms of the intervals present in a stimulus, so this is the only information present in $R(s)$.

The input to $R(s)$ is an audio file and the output is a 32 term vector describing the temporal intervals present in the stimulus¹. $R(s)$ applies a windowed auto-correlation function over the onsets in the audio file s , where the window is always

¹Note that for reasons of speed, the number of terms in $R(s)$ (32) was chosen to be the smallest number that clearly prevented quantization error from being a limiting factor of model performance.




Figure 2: The input to and the output from the ideal decision maker. Arrows towards a box represent input, arrows away from a box represent output. The decision maker is presented two stimuli (s_1 and s_2), transformed according to $R(s)$. Along the x-axis of each \mathbf{x} are the intervals from 10 to 1000ms on a log scale. Along the y-axis is the correlation of onsets in the stimulus to a particular interval. The decision maker is given the distribution of the standard ($p(\mathbf{x} | t, y = S)$) and the comparison ($p(\mathbf{x} | t, y = C)$) as determined by the ideal learner. These distributions are called stimulus models and are depicted along the same axes as the input.

proportional to the length of the interval in question. The result of this process is consistent with the model of human interval perception presented in (Buonomano, 2000), in the case where the input contains a single interval. The use of this representation is also supported by the fact that learning on temporal intervals does not generalize to untrained intervals, or to other tasks using the same standard (Wright et al., 1997).

A Gaussian random value is added to each term of the representation \mathbf{x} , with an experimentally determined standard deviation σ . This reflects the noise present in sensory systems.

In Figure 2 we represent an observed stimulus with a graph showing all 32 terms of \mathbf{x} . Each term corresponds to a time interval from 10 to 1000ms along a log scale (shown along the x-axis of \mathbf{x}_1 in Fig. 2). The value at each term of the vector (shown along the y-axis of \mathbf{x}_1) corresponds to the correlation in the stimulus to that particular interval: the highest peak in \mathbf{x}_1 is near 100ms, because the original stimulus s_1 has a 100ms interval in it.

Stimulus Models and Decision Making

Intuitively, a stimulus model can be understood as a perceptual template. During decision making, each stimulus (\mathbf{x}) is compared to these templates to determine which observed stimulus is most like the standard (e.g. the shorter interval in task T1) and which is most like the comparison (e.g. the longer interval in task T1). Formally, a *stimulus model* is a probability distribution over an internal representation of a stimulus (\mathbf{x}) conditioned on a particular task ($t = T1, T2$ or F) and stimulus type ($y = \text{Standard}(S)$ or $\text{Comparison}(C)$). Bayes rule can be applied to these distributions to find the probability that the first observation (\mathbf{x}_1) is the standard. A decision is

then made by choosing the most probable answer (i.e. “The standard was first.” or “The comparison was first.”).

Learning Stimulus Models

Each stimulus model is learned by a processes that can be understood as an averaging over many observations of \mathbf{x} . As more stimuli are observed, this average becomes more accurate, leading to more accurate decisions on the part of the model. If there have been no observations presented to the model, then the response given is random. In Figure 2 a standard and comparison stimulus model are shown. The graphs of these stimulus models are along the same axes as the input, and show the mean and variance of the distribution of \mathbf{x} for the given stimulus type.

For the ideal observer, learning occurs after each trial. The input consists of a series of observations. Each trial of a task is a two interval forced choice, meaning that there are two stimuli. Each observation corresponds to one of the two stimuli in a trial, and includes the stimulus (\mathbf{x}), the correct label for the stimulus (y)—either standard or comparison—and the task (t) that the stimulus was presented during—T1, T2 or F. The correct label is determined by the feedback provided at the end of a trial. The output of learning is a stimulus model for each task and stimulus type. The goal of learning is to determine how to update stimulus models such that they accurately reflect future observations, leading to better decisions.

To accomplish computational transfer learning for the experiments in question, our ideal observer *learns* which stimuli are drawn from the same distribution. This appears to be the only way in which tasks are relevant to each other in this set of experiments. As noted in the Human Data section, stimuli in task F have the same 100ms interval that the standard has in T1. Because only interval information is represented, our ideal observer represents these three sets of stimuli with the same distribution. The remaining types of stimuli (the standard and comparison for T2 and the comparison for T1) follow their own distinct distribution. Note that although the length of the comparison within each task varies over the course of learning, all comparisons within a task can be represented with the same stimulus model. In the ideal observer the sharing of distributions across tasks only improves learning (at least for the modeled tasks).

Due to considerations of space we do not provide a detailed explanation of how our model learns which stimuli across tasks share a distribution (see Little et al., 2011, for more details). In short we make use of a Dirichlet processes prior to cluster similar stimuli. This basic approach to transfer learning has been considered elsewhere (e.g. Roy & Kaelbling, 2007). We assume that observations follow a Dirichlet process prior with a base distribution where each input \mathbf{x} is distributed according to a multivariate Normal distribution, t a Bernoulli distribution and y a Bernoulli conditioned on t .

Prior to observing any trials of a given task humans are capable of above chance performance on the tasks. To represent this prior knowledge we initialize our model by presenting it an experimentally-determined number of trials. Psycholog-

ical limits are not introduced until after these initial trials, meaning that learning during initialization is optimal. The trials presented during initialization had a comparison whose delta varied around a mean m and standard deviation s , both of which were determined empirically.

Hypothesized Psychological Limits

We hypothesize four limits on top of our ideal observer for the modeled tasks. To distinguish it from the ideal observer, we refer to the full model as the *Limited Memory Model*. All versions of our model made an ideal decision given the stimulus models they were provided, but the way these stimulus models were learned was not always optimal.

Our choice to express limits in terms of stimulus models means that we are assuming people have something like a stimulus model in their brain: this is a reasonable assumption because to learn anything about a task, the stimuli from the task must be remembered, and a stimulus model is simply a compact representation of previously observed stimuli.

Single Task Limits There are two limits that apply during the learning of a single task.

The first limit we call the *volatility limit*. It states that during acquisition, trials are represented in a short term store. Stimulus models in this store are said to be *volatile*. Volatile stimulus models decay according to a loss parameter L . Thus, instead of being an average, a volatile stimulus models is more like a moving average. Because of this decay the *effective* number of trials that a volatile stimulus model represents will depend on the rate at which stimuli are presented. The more time that passes without observing more trials, the fewer effective number of stimuli a volatile stimulus model represents. There is evidence suggesting a distinction between short and long term stores of memory and that this short term store is transient (e.g. Izquierdo, 1999; Cowan, 2008). Recent work has shown that when trials are separated this appears to affect the effective number of trials a subject has observed (Zhang & Wright, 2010).

The second limit we call the *consolidation limit*. It states that after a short period of time (15 simulated minutes) during which trials for a task have not been observed, all volatile stimuli with a sufficient *effective* number of trials T are copied to a long term store. (In the full model this not an instantaneous processes, see the *recall limit*). Stimulus models in the long term store are said to be *consolidated*, and do not decay anymore. There is evidence both for a period of memory consolidation (McGaugh, 2000) and that this consolidation does not occur unless enough trials within each day are observed (Wright & Sabin, 2007). During decision making the stimulus models present in the long term store (not the short term store) are used. The model works this way because there is no *observable* learning within a day of practice for the modeled tasks (Wright & Sabin, 2007).

Multiple Task Limits The third limit we call the *item limit*. It limits the effective number of stimulus models (or items)

allowed in the short term store. Specifically it states that decay (L) is proportional to the total number of volatile stimulus models. This item limit is consistent with the notion that short term memory can only effectively store a limited number of items (e.g. Cowan, 2008). This limit explains why learning fails during the interleaved practice of T1 and T2, but not during interleaved practice of T1 and F. There are four distinct stimulus models when practicing T1 and T2 (the standard and the comparison for both tasks), all of which are volatile during interleaved practice: this means stimulus models decay too quickly and so the effective number of trials is never large enough for consolidation to occur. There are only two distinct stimulus models during interleaved practice of T1 and F (since there are two distinct intervals across these tasks), and so much less decay occurs, allowing consolidation.

The fourth limit we call the *recall limit*. It states that there is a period of time before models become fully consolidated when a stimulus model is being moved from the short to long term store. During this period, in which the model is said to be *transferring*, the stimulus models can be *recalled*, meaning they return to a volatile state. At this point they will only be consolidated for the same reasons that any volatile stimulus model is consolidated. This recall occurs when a newly observed stimulus belongs to one of the transferring stimulus models. In our model stimulus models move from a *transferring* to a *consolidated* state at the end of a simulated day. This limit is consistent with the idea that consolidation is not an instantaneous process: more permanent memories are formed over extended periods of time, and before consolidation is complete, it can be interrupted (e.g. McGaugh, 2000).

The recall limit explains why learning is interfered with during blocked practice of T1 and F, but not T1 and T2. When task F begins, T1 begins to be consolidated, and so T1’s stimulus models are transferring. However, task F shared a stimulus model with T1 and so all the transferring stimulus models are recalled. During blocked practice of T1 and T2, T2 shares no stimulus models with T1, and so the stimulus models of T1 can safely transfer from the short to the long term store. Note that T1 and F must also be consolidated during interleaved practice, and so the reader might view the recall limit as preventing learning in this case: however, because the consolidation limit states that consolidation begins shortly after a task is complete, and consolidates *all* stimulus models with sufficient trials, both tasks’ stimulus models are consolidated as a single unit in this case.

Evaluation

The purpose of our evaluation was to demonstrate that our limited memory model qualitatively matched the learning interference patterns observed in Wright et al. (2009) and Banai et al. (2009) and that this behavior of the model was due to all of our hypothesized limits.

To evaluate the hypothesized psychological limits we compared six different models: the ideal observer, the limited memory model—which included all hypothesized limits—

and four more versions, each with one of the limits removed. If all limits are necessary to explain the data then all but the full model should fail to predict when learning interference will occur for humans.

We simulated the experiments from Wright et al. (2009) and Banai et al. (2009) in the following way. For each task there were 60 trials per block and 6 blocks per day of practice. For each condition we ran 11 simulations (to simulate 11 participants). There was noise present in every stimulus, which meant each simulation of the experiment was different. We used 11 simulations for each condition because this is the maximum number of subjects for any condition used in Wright et al. (2009) and Banai et al. (2009). For each simulation we presented the stimuli to the model, following the same adaptive tracking procedure (to find the model’s threshold). The model provided the response it predicted to most likely be the correct response. After all 360 trials for each task were presented for a “day” the model was allowed to “sleep”. During this period of the simulation the system finished consolidation of any stimulus models still transferring, and all volatile stimulus models were fully forgotten if any decay was present. In this way the simulation of the trained conditions was made as parallel as possible to the human experiment.

Learner	Condition			
	Interleaved		Blocked	
	T1/F	T1/T2	T1/F	T1/T2
Human	X	-	-	X
Ideal	X	X	X	X
LMM	X	-	-	X
LMM - volatile	X	X	X	X
LMM - consolidated	-	-	-	-
LMM - item	X	X	-	X
LMM - recall	X	-	X	X

Table 1: Qualitative results across all learners. An X in a column indicates that the given learner showed observable learning on task T1 when interleaved or blocked with the specified task. LMM stands for the limited memory model, and LMM - L indicates that limit L was removed from the LMM model.

We simulated 11 control subjects by running two blocks (60 trials each), where no learning step was performed. This differed from the procedure used for control subjects in Wright et al. (2009) and Banai et al. (2009) in that some learning may have occurred during the pre- and post-test. This was because our model only simulated behavior during days of learning, not the pre- and post-test behavior. Model parameters (e.g. input noise σ) were held constant across all computational models.

If there was a significantly greater difference from pre- to post-test of a model, compared to control subjects, for a given condition, the model was said to have learned on this condition. This was determined by performing a two time (day 1 to day 6) by two group (trained vs. control) ANOVA, with

time as a repeated measure. Table 1 summarizes the results for all models. For all simulations marked with an X, p values were below 0.013, and all dashes where above 0.18. The results for the human data are taken from the prior analysis in Wright et al. (2009) and Banai et al. (2009). This table shows that, among the models we tested, only the limited memory model shows the same pattern of learning interference that humans showed.

Conclusions

In closing, we have presented a framework from which a variety of learning interference experiments might be modeled and studied, and have shown that this framework is capable of predicting the qualitative results of one challenging set of human data. Our work was grounded in the hypothesis that learning interference was an effect of how information is shared across tasks and the limits of human memory.

The model provides concrete predictions concerning future experiments. It predicts that if two tasks are interleaved they will interfere if there are many distinct stimuli across tasks. It predicts that during blocked presentation interference can occur when there are identical or very similar stimuli used across tasks. This is a consequence of the item limit, which limits how many distinct stimuli can be remembered at one time and the recall limit, which prevents consolidation of one task when a new task contains similar stimuli. These limits in turn have implications for the form and function of short and long term stores of perceptual memory.

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